Introduction
The concept of evil as privation has been a popular metaphysical account of the nature of evil within the Catholic Church for centuries, with many theologians espousing it as a satisfactory explanation for moral evil. Its similar role in the case of natural evil, however, has been less earnestly adopted, and for various reasons; initially, the contentions centred around human pain and suffering, but more contemporary debates have extended the picture to cover general creaturely suffering within an evolutionary context. The main aim for this paper is to address these issues and give a logical justification for considering natural evils as privative in character -the specific issues explored here are general pain and its applications in physical disease, depression, and creaturely suffering by genetic mutation. Although, before beginning this task, we must orient ourselves properly by first outlining a Thomistic account of privative evil.
Privative Evil

Outlining the Thomistic Account
Evil, for Aquinas, is not an entity that attains substance or being, but a privation of what has/is being/a good.
1 For evil to be privative, and not just merely negative, then it must be a negation of a good that naturally belongs to an entity, meaning that any evil for a being would be a denial for that being of what is due its perfection. 2 Now, this does not mean that evil does not exist at all, just that it does not have any existence independent of a good it deprives, implying that evil is parasitical on the good. 3 Furthermore, what is due some being for its perfection hinges upon the very essence/nature of that being itself. 3 Siniscalchi, "Thomas Aquinas, Natural Evil," 77.
does not signify some distinctive property, but the possession of whatever properties a thing (or act) must have to fulfill the standards appropriate to the kind of thing (or act) it is. In other words, to say that something is good is to say that it fulfills its possibilities or potentialities, and since the potentialities of a thing (or act) vary according to the kind of thing (or act) it is, the word "good" shifts its meaning in proportion to the kind of thing [or act] it is predicated of. 4 Nevertheless, all goods of creaturely perfection can only be considered as good, in the sense of "being" appropriate here, in relation to God, the highest good and the primary cause of all goodness.
Lee gives a good account of the logic behind the idea of evil as privation, in that the idea is entailed by the theistic position that all positive reality is God and what he creates, . . .
[such that if] evil were something positive, then . . . evil [would be] immediately caused by God . . . or that there is some being in the universe which is not immediately caused by God.
5
Positive evil, then, is a logically incompatible concept with God as fully good and the cause of every being. Nevertheless, for Lee, '[p] ositive entities can also be called "evil" because they cause evil (as when we say that this bacterium is evil though it is good in itself).' 6 This is not meant to insinuate some fundamental equivocality, whereby good and evil can be predicated of a substance at the same time and sense, but that an act or natural process can be considered good or evil depending on the particular cause-effect relation to which one is referring. In other words, for Aquinas, 'nothing prevents something absolutely good from being an evil for something else'. 7 This is why a bacterium causing sickness in a host directly causes the sustainment of its own existence (a good for the bacterium) through its acquisition of food and its concurrent metabolism, both of which might accidentally cause the host's being sick (a privation of normal biochemical equilibrium for the host). ' Siniscalchi, "Thomas Aquinas, Natural Evil, " 77. 11 Being -capital "B" -refers to that which is properly of God, while being, or beings -lowercase "b" -refer to that which is properly of created reality. 12 Aquinas, De malo, Q. 1, art. 1, co. 13 Aquinas, Q. 1, art. 1, ad. 8.
Remarks on the Purpose of Privative Evil
Yet, the questions of why there is evil, and why God has to permit it in the first place, There is an interesting link between Echavarria's account of natural evil and the privative theory of evil, since the former justifies privation based on the belief that it is part of God's plan for the universe's perfection, while the latter explains privation as damage/harm incurred when greater goods are deprived in tandem with the propagation of lesser ones. This latter explanation follows from the abovementioned case of the disease-causing bacterium being a good and a natural evil in two different senses -the greater good, in this case, being the normal biochemical equilibrium that is deprived while the lesser good of the non-normal state for the biological host obtains. To illustrate further, for example, if normal, natural functioning is a 14 Siniscalchi, "Thomas Aquinas, Natural Evil," 77. 15 Echavarria, 749. greater good than just mere functioning, then we can see how continuing to walk on a broken leg would be damaging: the privation of normal bone integrity does not disallow a creature to try and walk on its broken leg. The damage is done when the good of the creature's mere act of walking is unattended by the greater good of that creature walking while the leg bone is intact. This lack of normalcy in the order of its movement can then lead to subsequently more damage if the leg is not treated. Of course, whether this privation completely nullifies the chance for universal perfection, by not potentiating the attainment of goods greater than those so deprived, is, as mentioned above, a matter of faith.
Whether Pain is a Privative Evil
Nevertheless, many philosophers find this account of natural evil faulty, especially regarding the experiences of pain and suffering. Their arguments centre around the nonintuitiveness of associating suffering with privation, given the phenomena of pain as something experientially real and affectively substantial. We will see further on that these criticisms argue from a fundamentally different phenomenological stance than Aquinas' metaphysical one, and this point demands analysis if the claim of pain/suffering as related someway to natural evil as privation is to hold. First, though, we must come to terms with the conceptualisation of pain in this privative account of evil; an interesting debate between Lee and Crosby 21 will help with this task.
Pain as a Functional Facet of the Good
Lee notes that 'pain . . . is not in itself evil but is the perception of and reaction to what is evil.' 22 When someone feels pain in a normal context, they are signalled to a harm or a possibility of harm that they ought to avoid. Thus, when pain functions in such a way as to warn beings of danger, it is part of that being's natural signal-response system that is oriented towards keeping said being alive. As such, pain functioning as part of this system is, for Lee, professors, and so on.
Weaknesses in the Contentful Account of Evil (General Remarks)
Crosby's contention seems to centre around his characterisation of formal good as solely accounting for goods that living beings are not initially born with but must undergo some process of fulfilment to attain; for Crosby, the fact that such beings can already possess goods belonging to their kind, such as when we talk about the good or dignity of a human life, without having to work for their fulfilment already signifies error in the formal account of good.
However, Crosby's distinction between formal and contentful good is impoverished, in part because it is based on a misrepresentation of privation theory when he considers dignity, and other naturally bestowed "contentful" goods by virtue of type membership alone, as undeprivable. 31 It seems that, for Crosby, they are so because their non-being would be only Replacing non-existence with death leads to the same conclusion, since the death of a living being leads to a fundamental change in form from the living being in possession of a particular nature to another being in possession of a non-living form -either as a corpse or as dispersed matter/energy. However, the death of a living being is such a privation because what is lost is a necessary facet of the nature of all living things, namely, their life. Even if the actual living form/nature no longer persists, to regard the situation as one wherein, for Crosby, 'the condition for the possibility of privation seems to be eliminated' 33 is to relegate ontology to a purely physicalist interpretation; the condition still persists since privation is always a relational attribution, such that a deprived good need not necessarily only reference a physically extant being, but can also just simply point to the very being itself (in an abstract, memorial, and/or 29 Crosby, "Doubts About the Privation Theory," 492. 30 Crosby, 494. 31 Crosby, 492, 496-7. 32 Crosby, 497. 33 Crosby, 496. temporal mode) that is being excluded by death and/or annihilation. Depending on where specifically one would place the exact locus of this privative evil, one could thus make a move from phrases like, "privation of a being's health", to, "privation of a being from a world". Even Aquinas remarks on something similar when he noted that death is the ever-present accidental effect of Nature's striving for the good of things emerging in being, since 'Nature as a whole indeed causes things to come to be . . . and things to pass away because things cannot come to be without other things passing away.' 34 Evidently, Crosby seems to be confusing "content" with "already fulfilled/present nature/form", meaning that the ability of a living being to perfect their nature through their actions and choices does not entail that such beings start out with an ontologically blank slate.
There are inherent attributes to a being simply by their particular nature/form, but this is not "content" as much as it is "of their form". This natural state, of goods already belonging to a being that can still work to perfect its own nature, is still formal in character, and what Echavarria calls an entity being 'ontologically open'. 
Weaknesses in the Contentful Account of Evil (Remarks Concerning Pain)
The foregoing discussion is relevant to Crosby's analysis of pain and suffering since his claim that it disproves evil as privative hinges upon his content/form distinction. Crosby's main thesis surrounding his argument that pains, especially when caused by disease, are contentful evils is that these 'pains are the conscious subjective dimension of 35 Echavarria, "Debate on Evil," 751. 36 Crosby, "Doubts About the Privation Theory," 499. 37 Crosby, 498. 38 Crosby, 499. in an experiential sense, and which is felt without any "space", whereby the pain significantly points back to itself.
Crosby's view is a good example in how arguing from the position of phenomenological primacy -through the importance given to one's subjectivity -inhibits one's ability to appropriately account for subject-object relations. What is missed in his account of pain as contentful evil is that one's subjectivity is conditioned by the bodily object of the brain -we can come to detach ourselves to see ourselves as differentially object and subject, but this does not nullify the fact that we first and foremost have a brain that houses our subject-object conceptualisations. Similarly, with disease, the subjective experience of pain may indeed be part of, as Crosby describes, 'the unfolding of the evil of the illness', 40 but from a metaphysical perspective, taking evil as privation, this very unfolding is simply the emergence of pain as the aforementioned signal pointing one towards objective harm/damage; the unfolding is not the bequeathal of the status of evil from the disease to the pain by mere virtue of their experiential association.
Nevertheless, even if one's conceptualisation of subject-object relations is rectified to
give due importance to bodily objectivity, this does not necessarily prevent the phenomenologist from still claiming phenomenological primacy, simply because they could still take as fundamentally significant, as an assumed principle, experience and the explaining of one's intuitions through experience. However, taking a metaphysical approach does not necessarily preclude the experience of disease-caused pain as bad and repugnant -what the approach will caution about, though, is that just because we experience one thing as some attribute does not mean that this very thing is that attribute; a grounded approach would be where one's phenomenology is beholden to one's metaphysics, not the other way around. As such, Crosby's arguments concerning pain do not do much at all to contradict the privative account of evil or support the assertion that pains themselves are "contentful" evils.
Whether Depression is a Privative Evil
Moving forward, we will begin discussing depression's relation to privative evil due to the deep emotional suffering depressive affections elicit from those afflicted. Depression is an interesting case, for while one can characterise its pains as non-normally oriented, they are so 39 Crosby, 499. 40 Crosby, 500.
in a non-physical way. Furthermore, many who are suffering from it claim both that depressive feelings persist beyond their ability to control and that said feelings do not seem to have welldefined objects.
Depression as Phenomenological Reality and Privation of Normal Brain Functioning
Robson, in his analysis of depression, asks '[h]ow could these evils -these hopeless, terrible feelings -be accounted for under the evil as privation account?' 41 An immediate answer would be to consider depression as revealing a privation of normal mental functioning. are certainly real -even if certain depressive tendencies can be associated with non-firing neurons, it is not the fact that said neurons cause the feelings, but that this non-firing allows for the firing of other neurons in a non-normal context. 44 We can thus say that these feelings, notwithstanding any wilful causality, are caused by a brain structure deficient in the greater good of its functional normalcy. This is not to say that the deficiency itself is causal, but that whatever positive being is left over -the non-normal structure -is causal.
The evil in this analysis, since it is not a positive entity, is associated with depression insofar as reference is made to the brain's deficiency in normalcy. To be consistent with privation theory, the evil is an accidental effect, sourced from a positive, albeit attenuated brain structure whose mere functioning is a good insofar as it is an act/process in being. showcase is how evil as phenomenologically experienced necessarily entails it actually existing as something with ontological positivity.
Whether Evolutionary Pain is a Privative Evil
Explanatory Difficulties Associated with the Issue
After this account of the human evils of non-normally oriented pain and suffering, we can now start discussing how evil as privative explains the suffering experienced by animals throughout the evolutionary history of natural selection. The way forward is not as easy as one might think, though, for creaturely suffering, in a purely natural sense that doesn't consider human morality, can be traced back only to the creaturely/natural causes of predation, disease, and/or general misfortune; it might be tenable to relegate the natural evils experienced by people within a broad causal nexus of human will and culpability, but how can non-willed natural processes affecting animals be considered as having anything to do with evil? Is there a way to logically account for such evils without reference to divine punishment? there may be a way to argue a case for privative evil even in light of this evolutionary account.
A Way Forward (i.e. The Importance of Knowing What You are Referring to)
If we start with the assumption that genetic nature influences the essence of biological beings, then we come straight to the view that natural essences have been in constant flux ever since the inception of life on Earth. This means that what is normally understood as distinct goods proper to different creaturely types can be reinterpreted as interrelated realities, derived from the millennia of incremental genotype modulations that has led to the myriad of biological creatures present today. In other words, the good of creaturely flourishing may be a general good belonging to the very genus of biological organisms, but inter-generational gene mutations, because they contribute to type changes, also contribute to changes in the set of distinct goods necessary for the flourishing of the members of each different generation.
Thus, any effect directly caused by mutations, whether beneficial or detrimental to the creature, are not privations of the goods that ought to contribute to a flourishing related solely to that creature's specific natural type, for the mutations lead to those kinds of goods; however, they can be considered as privations of goods for flourishing related to the very nature of that creature as a biological being with life. This is because any mutation that directly hampers an organism's capacity to survive 52 is a mutation of a life-preserving system into one that is less so. This means that the mutation-associated suffering/harm is a good in relation to its pointing to the object of the evil that is the mutation of the life-preserving system, while the suffering/harm is an evil in relation to it being deprived of a naturally avoidable character, for unavoidable harm diminishes one's life; furthermore, the mutation itself is a good insofar as we refer only to its product, the mutated phenotype, as being part of the creature's positive nature, while the mutation is an evil insofar as it is precisely the mutation and deprivation of a life-preserving system. In the case where both the suffering and the mutation are evil, the deprivation of the greater good of a normal, life-affirming bodily system happens due to the actualisation of the lesser good of the mutated phenotype's progression typical of the creature's specific form.
Concluding Remarks
From the foregoing discussion, we can see how suited a privative theory of evil is towards explaining multiple themes of natural evil and helping to interpret our intuitions regarding pain and suffering in multiple contexts. We have also uncovered a common mindset espoused by detractors of the privative theory, which is their granting of more warrant towards a purely phenomenological account of evil as opposed to a metaphysically grounded one. 53 In general, the possibility of natural evil hinges on it having always been connected with creation, and on the purpose of God for the universe' perfectibility. Without this possibility for perfection, we would not be able to experience progression through a natural hierarchy of goods, which Echavarria considers as 'necessary for the greatest perfection of the universe', and thus why God 'sometimes permits that the things that by their own nature can fall, do effectively fall from their own good.' 54 52 The definition here will be "survival without naturally unavoidable suffering and harm" since this seems to avoid the absurd claim that any drastic reduction in a creature's absolute life span, due to the harm/suffering induced by the mutation, is now that creature's natural standard as a being with life (not as what is proper for its specific type, for the attenuated life span is proper for that creature's specific type), and one that sets itself as a definitive good necessary for the mutated creature's general flourishing (not the flourishing typical of that creature's mutated genotype, if there is such a thing) despite the unavoidable harm. 53 Lee concisely remarks on this issue by stating that 'the position that evil as such is a privation is a metaphysical account of evil, and so its truth (if it is true) may not be apparent to immediate experience or consciousness'. Lee, "Evil as Such Is a Privation," 471n9. 54 Echavarria, "Debate on Evil," 739.
